Quantitative Analysis of Health Insurance Reform: Separating Community Rating from Income Redistribution by Pashchenko, Svetlana & Porapakkarm, Ponpoje
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Quantitative Analysis of Health
Insurance Reform: Separating
Community Rating from Income
Redistribution
Svetlana Pashchenko and Ponpoje Porapakkarm
University of Virginia, University of Macau
23. October 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26158/
MPRA Paper No. 26158, posted 27. October 2010 14:31 UTC
Quantitative Analysis of Health Insurance Reform:
Separating Community Rating from Income Redistribution ∗
Svetlana Pashchenko† Ponpoje Porapakkarm‡
University of Virginia University of Macau
October 23, 2010
Abstract
Two key components of the upcoming health reform are a reorganization
of the individual health insurance market and an increase in income redistri-
bution in the economy. Which component contributes more to the welfare
outcome of the reform? We address this question by constructing a general
equilibrium life cycle model that incorporates both medical expenses and la-
bor income risks. We replicate the key features of the current health insurance
system in the U.S. and calibrate the model using the Medical Expenditures
Panel Survey dataset. We find that the reform decreases the number of unin-
sured more than four times. It also brings significant welfare gains equivalent
to almost one percent of the annual consumption. However, these welfare
gains mostly come from the redistributive measures embedded in the reform.
If the reform only reorganizes the individual market, introduces individual
mandates but does not include any income-based transfers, the welfare gains
are much smaller. This result is mostly driven by the fact that most unin-
sured people have low income. High burdens of health insurance premiums
for this group are relieved disproportionately more by income-based measures
than by the new rules in the individual market.
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1 Introduction
In Spring of 2010 the President of the U.S. signed the Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act which culminated a long and vigourous health reform debate. This
bill introduces a wide range of measures aiming primarily to increase health insurance
coverage. In particular, the bill significantly changes the rules under which the individ-
ual insurance market operates and introduces penalties for those without insurance. At
the same time it contains a set of measures that increase income redistribution in the
economy. The goal of this paper is to provide a quantitative analysis of the upcoming
reform in order to isolate the welfare effect of the reorganization of the individual market
from the effect of the increased income redistribution.
To do this we construct a general equilibrium life cycle model where agents face
two types of risks: uninsurable labor income risk and persistent medical expenses risk
that can be partially insured. We allow agents to be heterogeneous by educational level
(exogenously fixed) that together with age determines agents’ ability to generate income.
We replicate the key features of the current health insurance system. First, in our
model the insurance system consists of three components: individual market, employer-
based market, and public insurance. Second, public insurance is available only for lowest-
income individuals, while people with high income are more likely to get an employer-
based coverage. Third, the majority of uninsured can obtain insurance only from the
individual market because they do not have access to the employer-based market and are
not eligible for public insurance. At the same time this group of people tends to have low
income. Fourth, public insurance is free and employer-based premiums are community
rated. Those purchasing insurance in the individual market face premiums that depend
on their current medical shock and thus are exposed to premium fluctuations. After
calibrating the model to the key facts of the U.S. insurance system using the Medical
Expenditures Panel Survey, we introduce the changes specified in the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (hereafter the Bill).
These changes can be broadly divided into two groups. First, there is a reorganization
of the health insurance market that aims to create a risk-pooling mechanism outside the
employer-sponsored market. In particular, insurance companies will be banned from
conditioning premiums on the individuals’ health status or the history of claims. The
price of an insurance policy can only vary by age. This restriction is known as age-
adjusted community rating. To prevent cream-skimming behavior of insurers another
provision in the Bill is a guaranteed issue. Under this provision insurance companies are
not allowed to deny coverage to individuals based on health status. A possible outcome of
community rating combined with guaranteed issue is adverse selection spiral. To prevent
this outcome the Bill requires all individuals without health insurance coverage to pay a
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penalty unless the insurance premium constitutes a too high portion of their income.
Second, the Bill includes a set of redistributional measures. In particular, the Bill
includes provisions to expand Medicaid. Currently Medicaid covers several categories of
population (for instance, adults with dependent children, pregnant women) with income
below some threshold that significantly varies by state1. After the reform all people with
income below 133% of FPL become eligible for Medicaid. Also low-income people will
be able to get subsidies when buying insurance in the individual market. The goal of
the subsidy is to keep premiums people pay for a standard insurance policy below some
prespecified percentage of their income.
When evaluating welfare effects of the reform as a welfare criterion we use ex-ante
expected lifetime utility of a newborn in a stationary equilibrium. This welfare function
favors redistribution across people with different income net of medical expenses. The
reform introduces two additional channels of redistribution in the economy: first, from
healthy to sick (through community rating in the individual market), second, from high-
income to low-income (through subsidies and Medicaid expansion). Because neither of
these new redistributional mechanisms is conditioned on income net of medical expenses,
the resulting welfare effect of each mechanism is unclear: any redistribution from healthy
to sick involves some redistribution from healthy who are poor to sick who are rich.
Similarly every redistribution from rich to poor will involve some redistribution from rich
who are sick to poor who are healthy.
We find that the reform has a big effect on the fraction of the uninsured in the
economy: this number decreases from 22.2 to 4.7%. The largest effect the reform has
on young people in the lowest educational group: the fraction of the uninsured among
high-school dropouts aged 25 to 29 year old decreases from 62.1 to 9.9%. Also the
reform induces a larger participation in the individual market: the fraction of individually
insured increases from 7.4 to 18.3%.
In terms of welfare, we find that the reform brings significant gains equivalent to
almost 1% of the annual consumption. However, these welfare gains mostly come from
the redistributive measures embedded in the reform. If the reform is implemented without
subsidies and Medicaid expansion its welfare effects are significantly smaller.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Welfare gains of the reform are largely
driven by the change in welfare of low-income people. For the majority of this group
insurance premiums constitute a high fraction of income and they gain a lot from having
a subsidized coverage. On the other hand, the reorganization of the individual market
by itself has a limited effect on health insurance affordability for low-income people and
1As of 2009, 14 states had Medicaid eligibility threshold below 50% FPL, 20 states had it between 50
to 99% FPL, and 17 states had it higher than 100% FPL. U.S. average constitutes 68% of FPL (Kaiser
Family Foundation, 2009).
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they often prefer to stay uninsured if not subsidized.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3
introduces the model. Section 4 describes the changes introduces by the reform. Section
5 explains our calibration. Section 6 compares the performance of the model with the
empirical facts about the U.S. insurance system. Section 7 describes the quantitative
effects of the reform and decomposes its welfare effects. Section 8 concludes.
2 Related literature
Our paper is related to the literature on dynamic general equilibrium models with
heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets (Imrohoroglu (1989), Hugget (1993), Aiya-
gari (1994)). We belong to the branch of this literature that augments the standard
incomplete market model with an idiosyncratic health expenditure risk. For example,
Attanasio, Kitao, and Violante (2008) evaluate general equilibrium effect of different
Medicare reforms; Kopecky and Koreshkova (2009) study the effect of medical expenses
risk on wealth accumulation over the life-cycle. The closest paper to ours is Kitao and
Jeske (2009) who study tax subsidies for employer-based health insurance in the environ-
ment where private health insurance markets are explicitly modeled. Relative to Kitao
and Jeske, our model introduces public health insurance and also has more dimensions
of heterogeneity of individuals: we allow for a full life-cycle and different educational lev-
els. This augmented heterogeneity is important for studying the health insurance reform
because it has potentially significant redistributive consequences.
Our paper is also related to the literature studying different versions of the health
insurance reform in the U.S. Feng (2009) studies macroeconomic consequences of four al-
ternative reform proposals. His framework is three generations OLG model with endoge-
nous medical expenses and with two health insurance options: Medicaid and employer-
sponsored insurance (ESHI). Jung and Tran (2009) evaluate the welfare of introducing
universal medical vouchers in the U.S. economy using OLG model with endogenous med-
ical expenditures. Brugemann and Manovskii (2010) study how the the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act affects firms decisions to offer health insurance.
Finally, we relate to the literature that studies individual’s life cycle behavior in the
presence of exogenous out-of-pocket medical expenses shocks. Palumbo (1999) and De
Nardi, French, and Jones (2010) analyze savings decisions of retirees. Scholz, Seshadri,
and Khitatrakun (2006) study people’s decisions to save for retirement given that the
retirees face out-of-pocket medical expenses. Unlike these studies we introduce total
charged medical expenses in a life-cycle model and allow individuals to buy a partial
insurance in the health insurance market.
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3 Baseline Model
3.1 Households
3.1.1 Demographics and preferences
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of individuals. An individual
lives to a maximum of N periods, works during the first R− 1 periods of life and retires
at age R.
The population is assumed to remain constant. Agents who die are replaced by
the entry of newborn agents. There are intergenerational transfers through accidental
bequests. The savings of each household who does not survive is transferred to a new-
born agent.
Preferences are described with CRRA utility function with risk aversion σ:
u(c) =
c1−σ
1− σ
Agents discount future at a rate β and survive till next period with conditional probability
ζt which depends on age.
3.1.2 Health insurance
Each period an agent faces a stochastic medical expenditure shock xt. Medical shocks
evolve according to a Markov chain G(xt+1|xt, t). Every individual of a working age can
buy health insurance (HI) against this shock in the individual health insurance market.
The price of health insurance in the individual market is a function of an agent’s current
medical shock and age and is denoted by pI (xt, t).
Every period with some probability Probt the agent of a working age gets an offer to
buy insurance through the employer-based pool (ESHI offer). The variable gt character-
izes the status of the offer: gt = 1 in case an individual gets an offer, gt = 0 in case he
does not. All participants of the employer-based pool are charged the same premium p
regardless of their current medical expenses and age. An employer pays a fraction ψ of
this premium. If the worker chooses to buy group insurance he only pays p where:
p = (1− ψ) p.
Low-income individuals of a working age obtain their health insurance from Medicaid
for free. To qualify for this public insurance individual labor income adjusted for out-of-
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pocket medical expenses2 (yadjt ) should be below some threshold value y
pub
t
3.
All types of insurance contracts - group, individual, and public - provide only partial
insurance against medical expenditure shocks. We denote by q (xt) a fraction of medical
expenditure covered by the insurance contract. This fraction is a function of medical
expenditures.
We denote the health insurance status of individual by it. If it = 1 individual is
insured, otherwise it = 0.
All retired households are enrolled in the Medicare program. The Medicare program
charges a fixed premium of pmed and covers a fraction qmed (xt) of the medical cost.
3.1.3 Labor income
Working-age agents supply labor inelastically. Households differ by their educational
attainment denoted by e. Educational attainment can take three values. e = 1 corre-
sponds to absence of any degree, e = 2 corresponds to a high-school degree, and e = 3
corresponds to a college degree. Earnings are equal to w˜zet , where w˜ is wage and z
e
t is
idiosyncratic productivity of a person with educational level e and age t.
3.1.4 Taxation and social transfers
Households pay income taxes in the amount T (yt) . The taxable income yt is based
on both labor income and capital income. Since the ESHI premium is tax-deductable, a
household who buys a group insurance can subtract p from his taxable income.
We also assume a social welfare system, T SIt . The social welfare system guarantees
that every household will have a minimum consumption level at c. This reflects the option
available to the U.S. households with bad combination of income and medical shocks to
rely on public transfer programs. Retired households receive Social Security benefits
(sse) that depend on educational attainment e.
3.1.5 Optimization problem
Working age household (t < R) The state variables for the working age house-
hold’s optimization problem are liquid capital (kt ∈ K =R+ ∪ {0}), medical cost shock
2When determining Medicaid eligibility we do not take capital income into account because it de-
creases the accuracy of the computational algorithm. The results of the model are robust to this as-
sumption because most of the people who get Medicaid in our model have very low asset income.
3In reality the eligibility for Medicaid is not based only on income. Major categories of low-income
population that qualify for Medicaid are children, their parents and pregnant women. Given limited
demographic heterogeneity in our model we avoid this complication by providing Medicaid to all people
with low-income. We adjust labor income to account for the fact that many states (35) operate medically
needy program which is a part of Medicaid. This program allows individuals to subtract medical expenses
from their income when determining Medicaid eligibility.
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(xt ∈ X =R+ ∪ {0}), idiosyncratic labor productivity (zt ∈ Z =R+), ESHI offer status
(gt ∈ G = {0, 1}), HI status (it ∈ I = {0, 1}), educational attainment (e ∈ E = {1, 2, 3})
and age (t ∈ T = {1, .., N}).
In each period the household chooses his consumption (ct), savings (kt+1) , and HI
choice for the next period (i′H). If adjusted labor income y
adj
t of the individual is below
ypubt he is enrolled in Medicaid (we call this option BM). Otherwise, if he is offered an
ESHI, he has three options: not buying HI (NB), buying an individual HI (BI), and
buying a group HI (BG). If he does not have an ESHI offer, he has only two options:
NB and BI.
i′H =

BM ; if yadjt ≤ ypubt
NB,BI,BG ; if gt = 1 and y
adj
t > y
pub
t
NB,BI ; if gt = 0 and y
adj
t > y
pub
t
 (1)
The value function of a working-age household can be written as follows:
V (kt, xt, zt, gt, it, e, t) = max
ct,kt+1,i′H
u (ct) + βζtEtV (kt+1, xt+1, zt+1, gt+1,it+1, e, t+ 1) (2)
s.t. kt (1 + r) + w˜ z
e
t + T
SI
t = ct + kt+1 + xt (1− itq (xt)) + P (xt, i′H) + T (yt) (3)
where
w˜ =
{
w ; if gt = 0
w − cE ; if gt = 1
}
(4)
P (xt, i
′
H) =

0 ; if i′H = NB or i
′
H = BM
pI (xt, t) ; if i
′
H = BI
p ; if i′H = BG
 (5)
yt =
{
w˜zet + rkt ; if i
′
H 6= BG
max (0, w˜zet + rkt − p) ; if i′H = BG
}
(6)
T SIt = max (0, c+ xt (1− itq (xt)) + T (w˜zet + rkt)− w˜zet − kt (1 + r)) (7)
it+1 =
{
0 ; if i′H = NB
1 ; if i′H 6= NB
}
. (8)
The conditional expectation on the RHS of equation (2) is over {xt+1, zt+1, gt+1} .
The second equation is the budget constraint. w is wage per effective labor unit. If the
household has an ESHI offer, the employer partly pays for his insurance premium. To
maintain zero profit condition, the employer who offers HI deducts some amount cE from
the wage per effective labor unit.
Equation (8) maps the current HI status and HI choices into the next period HI
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status. If the household does not buy HI and do not get Medicaid, he will be uninsured
in the next period.
Retired household For a retired household (t ≥ R) the state variables are liquid
capital (kt), medical cost shock (xt), educational attainment (e), and age (t).
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V (kt, xt, e, t) = max
ct,kt+1
u (ct) + βζtEtV (kt+1, xt+1, e, t+ 1) (9)
s.t. kt (1 + r) + sse + T
SI
t = ct + kt+1 + xt (1− qmed (xt)) + pmed + T (yt) (10)
where
yt = rkt + sse
T SIt = max (0, c+ xt (1− qmed (xt)) + T (yt) + pmed − sse − kt (1 + r))
(11)
Distribution of households To simplify the notations, let define S as the space of
households’ state variable where S = K×Z×X×G×I×E×T for working-age households
and S = K×X×E×T for retired households. Let s ∈ S. Denote by Γ(·) the distribution
of households over the state-space.
3.2 Production sector
There are two stand-in firms which act competitively. Their production functions are
Cobb-Douglas, AKαL1−α, where K and L are aggregate capital and aggregate labor and
A is the total factor productivity. The first stand-in firm offers ESHI to its workers. The
second stand-in firm does not.5 Under the competitive behavior, the second firm pays
each employee his marginal product of labor. Because capital is freely allocated between
the two firms, Cobb-Douglas production function implies that the capital-labor ratios of
both firms are the same. Consequently we have
w = (1− α)AKαL−α, (12)
r = αAKα−1L1−α − δ. (13)
where δ is depreciation rate.
4The problem of a newly retired household is slightly different from a retired household. The insurance
status of a newly retired household depends on his insurance decision before the retirement. Thus the
state variables are {kt, xt, it}. Also out-of-pocket medical expenses are equal to xt (1− itq (xt)) .
5An alternative setup is that there are two islands which are different in terms of ESHI offer. Worker
are allocated randomly between the two islands while there is no friction on the capital market. Inside
each island, the labor market is competitive.
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The first firm has to partially finance the health insurance premium for its employees.
These costs are passed on to its employees through a wage reduction. In specifying this
wage reduction we follow Jeske and Kitao (2009) . The first firm subtracts an amount of
cE from marginal product per effective labor. Zero profit condition implies
cE =
ψp
(∫
1{i′H(s)=BG}Γ (s)
)
(
zet
∫
1{gt=1}Γ (s)
) . (14)
1{·} is a function mapping to one if its argument is true; otherwise the function is zero.
The nominator is the total contributions towards insurance premiums paid by the first
firm. The denominator is the total effective labor working in first firm. Thus cE exp (z
e
t )
is the wage reduction of every employee with an ESHI offer.6
3.3 Insurance sector
Health insurance companies both in private and group markets act competitively.
We assume that insurers can observe all state variables that determine future medical
expenses of the individuals7. This assumption together with zero profit conditions allow
us to write insurance premiums in the following way:
pI (xt, t) = (1 + r)
−1γIEM (xt, t) + pi (15)
for the non-group insurance market and
p = (1 + r)−1
γG
(∫
1{i′H(s)=BG} × EM (xt, t) Γ (s)
)
∫
1{i′H(s)=BG}Γ (s)
(16)
for the group insurance market. Here EM (xt, t) are expected medical costs of an indi-
vidual of age t and current medical costs xt covered by the insurance company:
EM (xt, t) = ζt
∫
xt+1q (xt+1)G(xt+1|xt, t).
γI and γG are markups on actuarially fair prices due to administrative costs in the indi-
vidual and group markets correspondingly; pi is fixed costs of buying individual policy8.
The premium in the non-group insurance market is based on the discounted expected
6The assumed structure implies a proportional transfer from high incomes to low incomes. An
alternative structure is a lump-sum wage reduction. This alternative structure is difficult to implement
in our setup since some workers will end up earning zero or negative wage.
7Currently most states allow insurance firms to medically underwrite applicants for health insurance.
8We add fixed costs only to individual insurance contracts because we assume in a group market
these costs almost disappear due to the economy of scale.
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medical expenditures of the individual buyer. The premium of the group insurance is
based on a weighted average of the expected medical costs of those who buy the group
insurance.
3.4 Government constraint
We assume that the government runs a balanced budget. This implies∫
T (yt) Γ (s) =
∫
t≥R
(sse + qmed (xt)xt − pmed) Γ (s)+
∫
T SIt Γ (s)+
∫
t<R
1{i′H(s)=BM}×q (xt)xtΓ (s)
(17)
The LHS is a total income tax from all households. The first term on the RHS is the net
expenditures on Social Security system and Medicare for retired households. The second
term is the cost of guaranteeing minimum consumption floor for households. The last
term is the cost of Medicaid.
3.5 Definition of stationary competitive equilibrium
Given the government programs
{
c, sse, qmed (xt) , pmed, y
pub
t
}
, the fraction of medical
costs covered by private insurers and Medicaid {q (xt)} , and the employers’ contribution
(ψ) , the competitive equilibrium of this economy consists of the set of time-invariant
prices {w, r, p, pI (xt, t)}, wage reduction {cE}, households’ value functions {V (s)} , de-
cision rules of the working-age households {ct (s) , kt+1 (s) , i′H (s) ; t = 1, ..., R− 1} and
of retired households {ct (s) , kt+1 (s) ; t = R, ..., T} , and the tax function {T (y)} such
that the following conditions are satisfied:
1. Given the set of prices and the tax function, the decision rules solve the households’
optimization problem.
2. Wage (w) and rent (r) satisfy equation (12) and (13) , where
K =
∫
kt+1 (s) Γ (s) +
∫
t<R
1{i′H(s)=BG}pΓ (s) +
∫
t<R
1{i′H(s)=BI}pI (x, t) Γ (s) ,
L =
∫
t<R
zetΓ (s) .
3. cE satisfies equation (14) ; thus the firm offering ESHI earns zero profit.
4. The non-group insurance premiums pI (xt, t) satisfies equation (15) and the group
insurance premium satisfies equation (16) . So heath insurance companies earn zero
profit.
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5. The tax function {T (y)} satisfies the government budget balance (17).
4 Changes introduced by the reform
This sections describes what modifications are introduced to the baseline model af-
ter the reform. When modeling the reform, we assume that there is no response from
production firms. In other words, the probability to get ESHI offer and the employer
contribution rate do not change after the reform9. This assumption is relaxed in the
Appendix.
4.1 Household problem
After the reform a working-age household has to take into account the fact that
depending on his insurance decision he may be subject to penalties or receive subsidies.
Also, more households become eligible for Medicaid. Subsidies and Medicaid eligibility
penalties depend on a household’s labor income; penalties are a function of total income10.
If we denote labor income of a household by ylabt , y
lab
t = w˜z
e
t , we can rewrite his budget
constraint in the following way:
kt (1 + r) + w˜z
e
t + T
SI
t + Sub(y
lab
t , i
′
H) =
ct + kt+1 + xt (1− itq (xt)) + P (xt, i′H) + T (yt) + Pen(ylabt + rkt, i′H)
where
P (i′H) =

0 ; if i′H = NB or i
′
H = BM
pI (t) ; if i
′
H = BI
p ; if i′H = BG

9This assumption results from the absence of consensus in the economic literature about the firms
response to the reform. Some economists express the concern that the reform will make many small
firms drop coverage due to the availability of subsidized insurance for their employees in the individual
market. On the other hand, Brugemann and Manovskii (2010) in a quantitative model show that the
number of firms offering coverage may increase. There is also a view that the reform will not change the
number of firms offering coverage. The Bill requires firms with more than 50 employees to pay penalties
if they do not offer coverage. However, 96% of firms with more than 50 employees already offer coverage
and among firms with more than 200 employees this number goes up to 99%. Also, the Bill allows for
tax credits for firms with less than 25 employees who offer health insurance coverage to its workers.
However, these tax credits are in effect for only two years.
10In the Bill subsidies depend on total income. Given our earlier assumption that Medicaid is a
function of labor income, we maintain the same assumption for subsidies as well. This is done to
preserve the relationship between Medicaid and subsidies eligibility rules specified in the Bill. In general
this assumption is unlikely to affect the main results because majority of people benefiting from the
reform have low labor and asset income. Thus counting asset income will not affect the eligibility for
this group.
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A subsidy is determined in the following way
Sub
(
ylabt , i
′
H
)
=

0 ; if i′H = NB,BG or y
lab
t ≥ th6FPL or (gt = 1 and pylabt > t g)
pI(t)
t c1
− ylabt ; if pI(t)ylabt > t c1 and th1FPL ≤ y
lab
t < th2FPL
pI(t)
t c2
− ylabt ; if pI(t)ylabt > t c2 and th2FPL ≤ y
lab
t < th3FPL
pI(t)
t c3
− ylabt ; if pI(t)ylabt > t c3 and th3FPL ≤ y
lab
t < th4FPL
pI(t)
t c4
− ylabt ; if pI(t)ylabt > t c4 and th4FPL ≤ y
lab
t < th5FPL
pI(t)
t c5
− ylabt ; if pI(t)ylabt > t c5 and th5FPL ≤ y
lab
t < th6FPL

A penalty is determined in the following way
Pen(ylabt + rkt, i
′
H) =
{
0 ; if i′H = BI,BG or
pI(t)
ylabt +rkt
> p c
max{κylabt + rkt,κ} ; otherwise
}
Here Sub
(
ylabt , i
′
H
)
is a subsidy to individual that depends on his labor income and deci-
sion to purchase insurance. Only individuals purchasing insurance outside the employer-
based market can get subsidy. The subsidy is determined on a sliding scale in the
following way. Individuals qualify for subsidy if their labor income is less than some
factor th6 of the federal poverty line (FPL). An individual with labor income in the
bracket [thiFPL, thi+1FPL] receives a subsidy that guarantees that his health insurance
premium does not exceed a fraction t ci+1 of his income (i = 1, .., 5). Individuals who
get an ESHI offer can qualify for a subsidy only if the share of employee’s contribution
to their income is higher than some number t g.
People with income below th1FPL qualify for Medicaid. At the same time individuals
who qualified for Medicaid before the reform maintain their eligibility. In other words
even if individual’s labor income is above th1 but after subtracting medical expenses his
income is below ypubt he still qualifies for Medicaid
11.
Penalty Pen(ylabt + rkt, i
′
H) works in the following way. If an individuals purchase
insurance or if the insurance premium exceeds fraction p c of his income, he does not pay
a penalty. Otherwise the penalty is equal to the greater of a flat rate κ and a fraction κ
of his income.
4.2 Insurance sector
After the reform premiums in the individual insurance market are not allowed to
depend on the current medical costs of policy buyers. The insurance premium of an
11The Bill changes general Medicaid eligibility rules but does not introduce changes in the Medically
needy program which stays at the discretion of the states.
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individual of age t˜ is determined in the following way:
pI
(
t˜
)
= (1 + r)−1γI
(∫
1{i′H(s)=BI,t=t˜} × EM
(
xt˜, t˜
)
Γ (s)
)
∫
1{i′H(s)=BI,t=t˜}Γ (s)
+ pi12.
4.3 Government constraint
We maintain the assumption that the government runs a balanced budget. This
implies
∫
T (yt)) Γ (s) +
∫
t<R
Pen(ylabt + rkt, i
′
H)Γ (s) = (18)∫
t≥R
(sse + qmed (xt, t)xt − pmed) Γ (s) +
∫
T SIt )Γ (s) +
∫
t<R
Sub(ylabt , i
′
H)Γ (s)
+
∫
1{i′H(s)=BM} × q (xt, t) xtΓ (s)
The LHS now has an additional source of revenue - penalties from those unwilling to
purchase insurance. The RHS has an additional category of expenditures - subsidies.
5 Data and calibration
5.1 Data
The dataset used for calibration of the model is the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
(MEPS). The MEPS collects detailed records on demographics, income, medical costs
and insurance for a nationally representative sample of households. It consists of two-year
overlapping panels and covers periods of 1996-2006. We use eight waves of the MEPS -
from 1999 to 200713.
The MEPS links people into one household based on an eligibility for coverage under
typical family insurance plan. This Health Insurance Eligibility Unit (HIEU) defined in
the MEPS dataset corresponds to our definition of a household. All statistics we use
was computed for the head of the HIEU. We define the head as a person who has the
highest income in the HIEU. A different definition of the head (based on gender) does not
give statistically different results. When computing all the statistics we use longitudinal
12We maintain the assumption that there are fixed costs associated with issuing the individual insur-
ance contract after the reform. This way we can measure how much does the welfare change due to the
reorganization of the individual market not due to the possible gains in efficiency.
13We do not use the first two waves of the MEPS because they do not contain the variables we use in
constructing a household unit.
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weights provided in the MEPS. Given that all individuals are observed for at most two
years, we pool together all eight waves of the MEPS. Since each wave is a representation
of population in each year, the weight of each individual was divided by eight in the
pooled sample.
In our sample we include all households’ heads whose age is at least 24 year old and
who have a labor income (defined later) which is non-negative. In addition, we exclude
people who are younger than 65 and receive Medicare. Most of non-elderly Medicare
beneficiaries are disabled and this status is not present in our model. The sample size
for each wave is presented in Table 1.
We use 2003 as a base year. All level variables were normalized to the base year using
Consumer Price Index (CPI). We also adjust for the growth rate of average medical
expenditures.
Table 1: Number of observations in eight waves of MEPS (1999-2007)
Panel 99/00 00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04 04/05 05/06 06/07 Total
Obs. 4,291 3,360 6,848 5,149 5,179 5,198 5,005 5,313 40,343
5.2 Demographics, preferences and technology
In the model agents are born at age 25 and can live to a maximum of age 8014. The
model period is one year so the maximum lifespan N is 56 periods. Agents retire at age
65, thus R is 40 periods. For the conditional survival probabilities ζt we use female life
tables from Social Security Administration.
The risk aversion parameter σ is set to 4 which is in the range of values commonly used
in the life-cycle literature. The discount factor β is calibrated to match the aggregate
capital output ratio of 3.
The Cobb-Douglas function parameter α is set at 0.33 which corresponds to the U.S.
economy capital income share. The annual depreciation rate δ is calibrated to achieve an
interest rate of 4% in the baseline economy. The total factor productivity A is set such
that the average labor income equals one in the baseline model.
14Agents in our model have shorter than usual lifespan because the MEPS has very few observations
on individuals that are older than 80 year old.
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5.3 Government
In calibrating the tax function T (y) we use a nonlinear relationship specified by
Gouveia and Strauss (1994):
T (y) = a0
[
y − (y−a1 + a2)−1/a1
]
This functional form is commonly used in the quantitative macroeconomic literature
(for example, Conesa and Krueger (2006), Jeske and Kitao (2009)). In this functional
form a0 controls the marginal tax rate faced by people with the highest income, a1
determines the curvature of marginal taxes and a2 is a scaling parameter. We set a0 and
a1 to be equal to the original estimates in Gouveia and Strauss (1994), 0.258 and 0.768
correspondingly. The parameter a2 is used to balance the government budget. When
implementing the reform we keep a2 fixed at a level that balances the budget in the
baseline economy. To achieve the balanced budget in the reformed economy, we adjust
the parameter a0. This is done to reflect the fact that the current administration plans
to finance the reform by increasing a tax burden on people with the highest income.
The minimum consumption floor c was calibrated to match the fraction of people
with assets below $5,000 in the baseline economy: the fraction of people whose assets are
non-negative and less than $5,000 was 12.1% in 2001 (Kennickel, 2003). Social security
replacement rates were set to 55, 45 and 35% of average education-specific labor income
for high-school dropouts, high-school and college graduates correspondingly. These re-
placement rates result from applying Social Security benefit calculation formula to the
average income profiles for each educational group.
Medicaid eligibility threshold ypubt was set to match age-profile of the fraction of
uninsured among people with the lowest educational attainment15. In particular, we
allow ypubt to take two values by increasing Medicaid eligibility threshold for those older
than 55 year old. This reflects the fact that Medicaid primarily covers people with
dependent children and pregnant women, and after age 55 fewer individuals fall under
these categories.
5.4 Insurance sector
The share of health insurance premium paid by the firm (ψ) was chosen to match
aggregate ESHI take-up rate16. The resulting number (77.5%) is consistent with the one
observed in the U.S. economy, which is in the range of 75-85% (Kaiser Family foundation
15We choose to match the fraction of uninsured among high-school dropouts because people in this
group are most likely to become eligible for Medicaid.
16In this paper we use the term ”take-up rate” only in relation to employer-based market, and it
defines a fraction of people among those with ESHI offer who choose to buy group insurance.
15
Employer Health Benefits Survey, 2002-2009).
We set proportional loads for group and individual insurance policies (γI and γG) to
1.11. This number comes from the study of Kahn et al.(2005). Fixed costs of buying
individual policy pi is set to 0.45% of average labor income (the average labor income
in our sample was 38,950 in 2003) or 253 in dollar terms. This parameter was used to
match the aggregate fraction of people with individual insurance.
5.5 Labor income
We divide households into three educational groups: high-school dropouts, high-
school and college graduates. The fraction of each group in the population is 15, 50, and
35% correspondingly. Workers with different education have different income processes,
specified as following:
zet = exp(λ
e
t ) exp(vt)
where
λet = ϕ
e
0 + ϕ
e
1t+ ϕ
e
2t
2 + ϕe3t
3
vt = ρvt−1 + εt, εt ∼ N(0, σ2ε) (19)
The education-specific coefficients ϕe0, ϕ
e
1,ϕ
e
2 and ϕ
e
3 were estimated from the MEPS
dataset. These coefficients are based on the following regression equation:
log(inct ) = ϕ
e
0 + ϕ
e
1t+ ϕ
e
2t
2 + ϕe3t
3 + ϕe3t
3 + ΦDt
where inct is a household labor income normalized by the average labor income ($38,950),
and Dt is a set of dummies for each year
17. Household labor income was defined as a sum
of wages (variable WAGEP) and 75 percent of income from business (variable BUSNP).
This definition is the same as used in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics Dataset
(PSID), which is commonly used for income calibration in the macroeconomic literature.
For the persistence parameter in the stochastic part of income ρ we use the value
0.985 and the variance of innovation σ2ε was set to 0.02. These values were chosen
so the model can reproduce the empirical fact that the cross-sectional variance of log of
consumption increases over the life-cycle,18,19. Our parameters are in the range estimated
in Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004) and Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994).
17Since the dependent variable is a log of income, we restrict the sample to individuals whose annual
income is greater than $1,000.
18The dynamics of variance of log of consumption over the life cycle is extensively discussed in Deaton
and Paxson (1994); Storesletten et al (2004); and Guvenen (2006).
19We approximate the income process in this way as opposed to estimating it from the MEPS because
in this dataset each individual is observed only for two periods. The transition matrix for income
constructed from a two-year panel fails to produce a high persistence of the income process and thus
underestimates a lifetime income risk in a full life-cycle model.
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In our computation we use a discretized version of the income process. To construct
the age and education-specific grids and transition matrix we use the method suggested
by Floden (2008)20 to discretize the stochastic part of the income process vt. Then we
scale each grid by the deterministic education-specific component λet . To construct the
distribution of newborn individuals, we draw v1 in equation (19) from the normalN(0, σ
2
ε)
distribution. Figure (1) compares actual and simulated labor income profiles.
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Figure 1: Simulated vs. actual labor income
5.6 Offer rate
We assume that probability to get an offer of ESHI coverage is a logistic function21:
Probt =
exp(ut)
1 + exp(ut)
where the variable ut is an odds ratio that takes the following form:
ut = η
e
0 + η
e
1 log(inct ) + η
e
2 [log(inct )]
2 + ηe3 [log(inct )]
3 + ηe41{gt−1=1} +Θ
eDt (20)
20The method suggested by Floden (2008) gives higher accuracy than more commonly used Tauchen
and Hussey (1991) discretization method if the persistence parameter of the AR(1) process is high, as
it is in our case.
21In our estimation we assume that an individual has an offer if any member of his HIEU reports having
an offer in at least two out of three interview rounds during a year (variables OFFER31x, OFFER42x,
OFFER53x). In addition we exclude households’ heads whose income was below $1,000 when estimating
the logistic regression.
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Here ηe0, η
e
1, η
e
2, η
e
3, η
e
4 and Θ
e are education-specific coefficients. The initial offer rate (g0
in equation (20)) was constructed based on the fraction of people having an offer at age
24 for each educational group. Simulated and actual offer rates are presented in Figure
(2). Our simulated offer rates can replicate large differences in age profiles of ESHI offer
rates among educational groups. We are also able to capture the dynamics of the offer
rate. Table 2 compares the probability to get an offer this period conditional on having
an offer last period for different educational groups.
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Age
O
ffe
r r
at
e
 
 
NHS, data
HS, data
Col, data
NHS, simul
HS, simul
Col, simul
Figure 2: Simulated vs. actual offer rates
NHS Data Model
Offer previous period 0.87 0.87
No offer previous period 0.06 0.08
HS Data Model
Offer previous period 0.94 0.94
No offer previous period 0.14 0.19
College Data Model
Offer previous period 0.96 0.96
No offer previous period 0.19 0.21
Table 2: Conditional probability to get ESHI offer: data vs. model
5.7 Insurance status
In the MEPS the question about the source of insurance coverage is asked retrospec-
tively for each month of the year. When measuring the insurance status in the data
we use the following approach. We define the person as having an employer-based in-
surance if he reports having ESHI for at least eight months during the year (variables
PEGJA-PEGDE). The same criteria was used when defining public insurance (variables
18
PUBJA-PUBDE) and individual insurance status (variables PRIJA-PRIDE). For those
few individuals who switch sources of coverage during the year, we use the following
definition of insurance status. If a person has both ESHI and individual insurance in
one year, and each coverage lasted for less than eight month, but the total duration
of coverage lasted for more than eight months, we classify this person as individually
insured. Likewise, when a person has a combination of individual and public coverage
that together lasts for more than eight months, we define individual as having public
insurance22.
5.8 Medical expenditures
Medical costs in our model correspond to the total paid medical expenditures in
the MEPS dataset (variable TOTEXP). This includes not only out-of-pocket medical
expenses but also the part of costs covered by the insurer. In calibration we categorize
medical expenditures for each age into seven bins with the bin of size 20th, 40th, 60th,
80th, 95th and 99th percentiles. To adjust for medical costs growth, we normalize each
year’s medical expenses by a health inflation index. This index was constructed by
computing growth rate of average medical expenses for each year relative to the base
year 2003. To construct the transition matrix we measure the fraction of people who
move from one bin to another between two consecutive years separately for people of
working age (25-64) and for retirees (older than 65). The mean and variance of medical
expenses simulated by our model and observed in the data are compared in Figures (3)
and (4). Our medical shock process tracks closely empirical mean and variance. It also
captures the fact that both mean and variance of medical expenses increase steeply with
age.
To determine the fraction of medical expenses covered by insurance policies q (xt)
and qmed (xt) we use the following approach. For working age households we estimated
medical expenditures paid by insurers (variable TOTPRV) as a quadratic function of
total paid medical expenditures and year dummy variables. For retired households we
estimated Medicare payments (variable TOTMCR) as a linear function of total paid
medical expenses23 and year dummy variables. We include only single households with
positive health expenses in our sample. We use these estimates to compute the ratio of
medical costs covered by the insurance for each gridpoint of medical expenses for each
age. Estimated ratios for private insurance and Medicare are presented in Figures (5)
and (6). The lines show the fraction of medical costs covered by the private insurance
(for working age households) or Medicare (for retired households) for each discretized
22The results do not significantly change if we change the cutoff point to 6 months or 12 months.
23The second order term is not significant, so we removed it from the estimated equation. The R2 for
working age people is 0.75, while for retirees is is equal to 0.72.
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Figure 3: Mean of medical expenses normalized by
average wage
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Figure 4: Variance of medical expenses normalized
by average wage
medical expenses grid.
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Figure 5: Coverage ratio, private plans
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Figure 6: Coverage ratio, Medicare
5.9 Summary of the parametrization of the baseline model
The model parametrization is summarized in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 presents para-
meters that were set outside the model, and Table 4 shows parameters that were used to
match some targets in the model.
5.10 Health reform parameters
The values for the parameters of the reform are taken from the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act signed on March 23, 2010. These values are summarized in
Table 5.
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Parameter name Notation Value Source
Risk aversion σ 4 -
Cobb-Douglas parameter α 0.33 Capital share in output
Tax function parameters: a0 0.258 Gouveia and Strauss (1994)
a1 0.768 Gouveia and Strauss (1994)
Social Security replacement rates:
Below High-School ss1 55% SS Benefits formula
High-School ss2 45% SS Benefits formula
College ss3 35% SS Benefits formula
Insurance loads:
Individual market γI 1.11 Kahn et all (2005)
Group market γG 1.11 Kahn et all (2005)
Medicare premium pmed $1,055 Total premiums =2.11% of Y
Federal Poverty Line FPL $9,573 Data
Table 3: Parameters set outside the model
The penalty as a fraction of taxable income (κ) is set to 2.5%. The lowest fraction
of health insurance premium in taxable income that allows for exemption from penalties
(p c) is set to 8%. For the fractions of the highest allowable share of insurance premium
in income we use the numbers that correspond to the midpoints of the intervals specified
in the Bill.
The lowest share of employee contribution to taxable income that allows an individual
with ESHI offer to qualify for subsidies (t g) is set to 9.5%. Federal Poverty Level (FPL)
is set to 23% of average labor income. This corresponds to the Census poverty line for
family of one in 2009 ($9,573).
6 Baseline model performance
Table 6 compares aggregate health insurance statistics generated by the model with
the ones observed in the data. The model was calibrated to match the data on ESHI
take-up and individual insurance rates. However, the model also produces numbers on
the fractions of uninsured and publicly insured close to the data. The model slightly
underestimates the fraction of publicly insured (4.5 in the model vs. 6.1% in the data).
This is due to the fact that our model has a very stylized representation of Medicaid. An
underestimation of publicly insured leads to an overestimation of uninsured given that
both publicly insured and uninsured are predominantly composed of low income people
without an ESHI offer.
Table 7 shows insurance statistics by educational groups. Our model does not target
most of these statistics (except the uninsurance rate among high-school dropouts), but
21
Parameter name Notation Value Source/Target
Discount factor β 0.962
K
Y
= 3
Depreciation rate δ 0.07 r = 0.04
Tax function parameters: a2 0.652 Balanced government budget
Consumption floor c $5,265 % with assets<$5,000=12.1%
Insurance loads:
Fixed costs pi $253 % of individually insured=7.6%
Employer contribution ψ 77.5% ESHI take-up rate=94%
Stochastic productivity process
Persistence parameter ρ 0.985 Life-cycle profile of
Variance of innovations σ2ε 0.02 log of consumption variance
Medicaid eligibility threshold ypubt
{
0.95FPL if age ≤ 55
0.65FPL if age>55
}
% of uninsured HS dropouts
Table 4: Parameters used to match some targets
it still fares well along these dimensions.
Figures (7) and (8) compare life-cycle profiles of fraction of people with ESHI and
ESHI take-up rates for different educational group in the model and in the data. The
model reproduces the general life cycle pattern and differences in educational group in
employer-based insurance rates and ESHI take-up rates. However it underestimates the
take-up rates for young people. This is due to the fact that in our model there is only
one insurance policy available from the employer. Individuals of all ages have to pay the
same price for employer-based insurance and it involves significant cross-subsidization
from young to old. Many young are unwilling to buy this unfair insurance. The fact
that in the data the take-up rates for young are higher may indicate that there is some
risk-separation exists in firms that offer several insurance policies, some contracts are
more suited for the young and some - for the old.
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Figure 7: Percent of people with ESHI
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Figure 8: ESHI take-up rate
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Parameter name Notation Value
Penalty (fraction of taxable income) κ 2.5%
Flat penalty rate κ $695
Premium/income for penalty exempt p c 8%
Income level thresholds for subsidies
th1 1.3
th2 1.5
th3 2.0
th4 2.5
th5 3.0
th6 4.0
Premium/income targeted by subsidy
t c1 2.0%
t c2 3.5%
t c3 5.2%
t c4 7.2%
t c5 8.8%
t c6 9.5%
Premium/income to get subsidy with ESHI offer t g 9.5%
Table 5: Parameters of the reform
In general the insurance purchase decision depends on agent’s wealth in a non-linear
way. People don’t buy insurance if they are very poor because in this case when hit by
a big medical shock they rely on the consumption minimum floor. Also people do not
buy insurance when they accumulate enough wealth to self-insure. The preference for
self-insurance arises because available health insurance contracts are not actuarially fair
because of administrative costs. The preferences for self-insurance as opposed to health
insurance is especially strong for individuals with low expected medical expenses.
Figure (9) compares the percentage of uninsured produced by the model with those
in the data. The model was calibrated to match the uninsurance rates for high-school
dropouts, but it is able to capture the life-cycle uninsurance profiles for people with
Variable Data Model
Insured by ESHI (%) 66.1 66.2
Individually insured (%) 7.6 7.4
Uninsured (%) 20.2 22.2
Publicly insured (%) 6.1 4.1
ESHI take-up rate (%) 93.8 93.9
Group premium ($) 3,383 2,643
Table 6: Insurance statistics: data vs. model
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Variable Data Model
Individually insured (%)
No High-School degree 5.7 6.6
High-School degree 7.5 8.1
College degree 8.6 6.9
Uninsured (%)
No High-School degree 42.0 43.3
High-School degree 20.5 20.5
College degree 10.3 15.7
Variable Data Model
Publicly insured (%)
No High-School degree 15.8 17.6
High-School degree 6.1 2.5
College degree 1.9 0.4
ESHI take-up rate (%)
No High-School degree 87.4 87.3
High-School degree 93.4 94.2
College degree 95.9 94.8
Table 7: Insurance statistics for educational groups
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Figure 9: Percent of people without insurance
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Figure 10: Percent of people with public insurance
high-school degree. However, the model overestimates the number of uninsured among
college graduates. Our model predicts that insurance behavior for high-school and college
graduates should be more similar than in the data. This suggests that differences in life-
cycle labor income profiles alone are not enough to generate the observed differences
in insurance behavior. In reality college and high-school graduates differ not only in
labor-income profiles, but also in initial wealth and the quality of available insurance
policies.
Figure (10) plots percent of publicly insured people in the model and in the data. The
model tends to underpredict the number of publicly insured with high-school and college
degree. This is due to the fact that we use uniform eligibility criteria while in reality all
states have different Medicaid rules. For some states Medicaid eligibility income threshold
can go up to 200% FPL which explain why in the data we observe college graduates with
public insurance more often than in the model24.
24An alternative strategy is to introduce a probability to enroll in Medicaid as in Feng (2009). However,
this requires an additional state variable, thus, exponentially increases computational costs.
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Figure (11) plots percent of people with individual insurance for each educational
group. The model approximately matches the overall participation in the individual
market, however the number of people purchasing individual insurance at very young
ages is too high. This it due to the fact that in our model people start working life at age
25 being relatively poor. In the data many people by age 25 have already accumulated
some assets. As was mentioned before, once a healthy person accumulates capital he has
a strong preference for self-insurance, that is why we observe a sharp decline in individual
insurance purchases in later ages. The difference in individual insurance take-up rates
observed in the model and in the data is thus due to the differences in wealth distribution
of 25 years old.
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Figure 11: Percent of people with individual insurance
7 Effect of the reform
This section describes the new steady-state that economy converges to after the reform
is implemented.
25
7.1 Aggregate insurance statistics
Table 8 compares aggregate insurance statistics between the two steady-states: in the
baseline and in the reformed economies.
Variable Baseline Reform
Insured by ESHI (%) 66.2 67.5
Individually insured (%) 7.4 18.3
Uninsured (%) 22.2 4.7
Publicly insured (%) 4.1 9.4
ESHI takeup rate (%) 93.9 95.7
Group premium ($) 2,643 2,510
Aggregate capital 3.40 3.24
Table 8: Insurance statistics before and after the reform
The fraction of people with ESHI stays almost the same which is not surprising given
our assumption that neither ESHI offer rates nor employer contribution rates change in
response to the reform. The percent of people with individual insurance increases more
than twice: from 7.4 to 18.3%. At the same time there is a big drop in the uninsurance
rate: it goes down from 22.2 to 4.7%; thus the uninsurance rate decreases by 78%25.
The number of publicly insured increases from 4.1 to 9.4% due to the expansion of
Medicaid. Finally, there is a small increase in ESHI take-up rate from 93.9 to 95.7%
which is due to the effect of penalties.
Table 9 displays changes in government finances after the reform. The increase in
government spending on subsidies net of penalties and on Medicaid expansion constitutes
around 130%. On the other hand, there is a significant decline in spending on transfers to
guarantee consumption minimum floor. For working age households these transfers drop
by more than 70%. This explains why the marginal tax rate for a person with average
income increases by only 0.91 percentage points in the reformed economy26.
7.2 Effect on different educational groups
Left panel of Figure (12) compares the percent of people without health insurance at
each age and educational group before and after the reform. In all educational and age
groups there is a noticeable decline in the fraction of uninsured. The largest reduction
25This number is close to the results of the health reform in Massachusetts which has design similar
to the national health reform. In Massachusetts the fraction of uninsured dropped by around 75% after
the reform - from 11% in 2005 to 2.7% in 2009 (Massachusetts Health Connector).
26The change in the tax rates after the reform is discussed in more details in the Appendix.
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Change in Value
Spending on health insurance for working-age (%) +131.3
Spending to guarantee minimum consumption for working-age (%) -72.6
Marginal tax for average wage (percentage point) 0.91
Table 9: Change in the government finances after the reform
in the number of uninsured is observed among 25-29 year old high-school dropouts: the
percent of uninsured in this group goes down from more than 60 to 10%. For older high-
school dropouts the decline in uninsurance is less but still large: the minimum decline
is 29%. The fact that the reform has the largest effect on the number of uninsured
among people without high-school degree is not surprising. People in this educational
group have low income and thus are more likely to qualify for Medicaid or subsidies. In
contrast, the noticeable decline in the number of uninsured for college graduates is due
mostly to the effect of penalties because only few in this group are eligible for expanded
Medicaid or subsidies.
Right panel of Figure (12) displays the fraction of people with public insurance. The
expansion of Medicaid does not have much effect on college graduates. However its
effect is noticeable for high-school graduates and there is a big increase in the number
of publicly insured among high-school dropouts. For example, for 25-29 year old high-
school dropouts the fraction of publicly insured increases from around 14 to 45%. For
all educational group we observe an increase in the number of publicly insured after age
55. In the baseline economy people after age 55 have lower Medicaid eligibility income
threshold than younger people. The reform introduced new eligibility threshold which is
the same for all people. Thus near elderly who previously did not qualify for Medicaid
now get public coverage. This captures the important effect of the reform: it does not
only increase income eligibility threshold, but it also treats all people equally by removing
categorical eligibility requirement.
Left panel of Figure (13) compares the individual insurance rates in the baseline
and reformed economies. The fraction of individually insured increases in all ages and
educational groups. Due to income-based subsidies the largest increase in the number of
individual market participants is observed among high-school dropouts.
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Figure 12: Percent of uninsured (left panel) and publicly insured (right panel) before and after the
reform
28
25−29 30−34 35−39 40−44 45−49 50−54 55−59 60−64
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Age
%
 o
f p
eo
pl
e 
wi
th
 in
di
vid
ua
l in
su
ra
nc
e
No high−school degree
 
 
Baseline
Reform
25−29 30−34 35−39 40−44 45−49 50−54 55−59 60−64
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Age
%
 ta
ke
up
 ra
te
No high−school degree
 
 
Baseline
Reform
25−29 30−34 35−39 40−44 45−49 50−54 55−59 60−64
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Age
%
 o
f p
eo
pl
e 
wi
th
 in
di
vid
ua
l in
su
ra
nc
e
High−school degree
 
 
Baseline
Reform
25−29 30−34 35−39 40−44 45−49 50−54 55−59 60−64
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Age
%
 ta
ke
up
 ra
te
High−school degree
 
 
Baseline
Reform
25−29 30−34 35−39 40−44 45−49 50−54 55−59 60−64
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Age
%
 o
f p
eo
pl
e 
wi
th
 in
di
vid
ua
l in
su
ra
nc
e
College degree
 
 
Baseline
Reform
25−29 30−34 35−39 40−44 45−49 50−54 55−59 60−64
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Age
%
 ta
ke
up
 ra
te
College degree
 
 
Baseline
Reform
Figure 13: Percent of people with individual insurance (left panel) and ESHI take-up rates (right
panel) before and after the reform
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Right panel of Figure (13) displays ESHI take-up rates before and after the reform.
The direction of change in take-up rates is different across educational groups. For high-
school dropouts there is a decrease in take-up rates for all age groups. This is the effect
of Medicaid expansion and the fact that only people buying insurance in the individual
market qualify for subsidies. Thus we observe a crowd-out of ESHI by Medicaid and
subsidized individual insurance27.
For high-school graduates this crowd-out effect is observed only for people older than
age 40 while for younger ages the take-up rates actually increase. This asymmetric effect
is explained by two things. First, the subsidy is linked both to income and individual
market insurance premiums. So to get a subsidy a person not only has to have low-
income but he also has to face high enough insurance premiums. Second, insurance
premiums in the individual market are age-adjusted and increase with age. Thus many
young high-school graduates do not qualify for subsidies because their income is too high
relative to premiums. However, older high-school graduates face higher premiums in the
individual market which makes it easier for them to qualify for subsidies, hence they drop
the employer coverage.
To illustrate this point further Figure (14) plots the share of the individual market
premium in average income for each age and educational group in the reformed economy.
One can see that for all educational groups we observe an increase in the burden of health
insurance with age. For high-school dropouts the share of premium to income is always
above 10%. For college graduates this share is always below 10% and reaches 7.5% only
by age 55. For high-school graduates the premium to income ratio reaches 7.5% much
sooner - by age 40.
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Figure 14: Share of individual premiums in average income for each educational group
27Cutler and Gruber (1996) also found that Medicaid expansion over the 1987-1992 period caused
crowd-out of ESHI resulting from the fact that employees do not take coverage when it is offered.
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College graduates increase take-up rates of ESHI in almost every age except for several
years before retirement. This pattern is due to the fact that people in this educational
group have to pay penalties if they do not buy insurance and they do not qualify for
subsidies in the individual market.
Figure (15) plots the percent of people who receive subsidies or are enrolled in Medic-
aid. The highest number of beneficiaries is observed among young high-school dropouts:
almost 90% of this group is enrolled in Medicaid or receive subsidies. For all educational
groups there is an increase in fraction of beneficiaries towards pre-retirement ages because
of the raising share of the individual market premium in income.
The average amount of the subsidy for those who receive it is displayed in Figure
(16). Average subsidy increases with age because individual market premiums increase
with age faster than income for many subsidy recipients. Thus to keep the fraction of
premium in income low these people have to receive more subsidies as they age. The
average amount of subsidies for those who receive it does not differ much by educational
group. In general the average size of the subsidy varies from around $500 to $900 for
people aged 25-29 year old depending on education. For people of pre-retirement age the
size of the subsidy varies from $3,800 to $4,000 depending on education.
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Figure 15: Percent of people getting subsidies and
enrolled in Medicaid
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Figure 16: Average size of the subsidy
Figure (17) shows the fraction of people who pay penalties. This fraction is very low
for all educational groups: it never exceeds 5%. For all educational group we observe
an inverse U-shaped pattern of the fraction of penalty payers after age 30. This is due
to the fact that middle-aged people have the highest preferences for self-insurance: their
income increased but their expected medical costs are still low so even with the penalty
some of them are better off staying uninsured.
Surprisingly for the group aged 30 to 50 year old the highest fraction of people paying
penalties is observed among high-school dropouts. However, this is the group that do not
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qualify for subsidies due to low premium to income ratio and they do not have an offer of
ESHI. In this situation they prefer paying penalties to buying non-subsidized individual
insurance.
Figure (18) plots the average size of the penalty for those who pay it. The penalty
increases with age because it is linked to individual income. If young people on average
pay penalty around $800, for individuals around retirement age it can go up to more
than $2,000.
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Figure 17: Percent of people getting penalties
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Figure 18: Average size of the penalty
7.3 The effect on the individual market insurance premiums
Figure(19) plots the age-adjusted community-rated premium that will be charged
in the individual market after the reform28. The premium increases with age due to
the increase in the mean of medical expenses. Figure(19) allows to compare premiums
in the individual and employer-based markets. The latter premium is also community
rated though not age-adjusted. The individual market premium stays below the group
premium for people younger than age 44, for people older than 44 the individual premium
exceeds the group premium, and the gap increases with age.
Figure(19) also allows to compare the community-rated premium in the individual
market with risk-adjusted premiums in the unregulated market. The dash lines plot
individual premiums conditioned on medical expenses for the five lowest grids of medical
expenses. One can see that the community-rated premium exceeds risk-adjusted premium
for the three lowest medical expenses groups. It stays around the level of unregulated
28Because of the subsidy schedule embedded in the reform we do not have to worry about the possibility
of equilibrium when only people with high medical expenses participate in the market and the resulting
price is very high. The subsidy guarantees that the fraction of paid insurance premiums in income
does not depend on the actual size of the premium. This significantly reduces the sensitivity of market
participants to the price of insurance.
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premium for people on the 4th grid of medical expenses. The fact that the community
rated premium is below the risk-adjusted premiums for the highest three medical expense
groups, means that after the reform we observe a good risk-pooling in the individual
market without the signs of the adverse selection spiral. Next section will discuss how
much this outcome is due to penalties and how much - to subsidies.
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Figure 19: Individual vs group market premiums
7.4 Welfare
Consumption equivalent variation for the reformed economy is presented in the first
row of Table 10. The reform brings a significant welfare improvement: a newborn in the
baseline economy is willing to give up 0.97% of consumption every period to be born in the
reformed economy29. To illustrate the source of these welfare gains Figures (20) and (21)
plot the level and the log-variance of consumption over the life-cycle before and after the
reform. On average after the reform we observe a decrease in consumption at all ages. At
the same time the reform brings a significant decline in consumption variance. This means
the welfare gains of the reform come from the increased risk-sharing in the economy.
This increased risk-sharing is a result of two things. First, people with bad labor market
outcomes get transfers from people with good labor market outcomes in terms of subsidies
for health insurance purchase. Second, people with high medical expenses get cross-
subsidized by people with low medical expenses through community rated individual
market. Once educational attainment is realized there is a significant variation in welfare
29We compare welfare between two steady-states without taking into account the transition period.
Since the aggregate capital in the reformed economy is lower than in the baseline, taking transition
period into account will make welfare gains even larger.
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CEV(%) Agg. capital
No high-school High-school College (% of the
All newborns degree degree degree baseline)
Reform 0.97 2.37 1.79 -0.06 95.3
Only CR 0.05 0.20 0.15 -0.06 100.1
Only CR+high penalties 0.09 0.15 0.13 0.04 99.4
Only redistribution 1.16 2.46 1.98 0.15 95.8
Only redistribution+penalties 1.10 2.38 1.92 0.09 95.3
Table 10: Welfare effect of different versions of the reform
effects of the reform for newborns in different educational groups. High-school dropouts
gain the most from the reform: the consumption equivalent variation for this group
is 2.37%. On the other hand, newborns with college education prefer the unreformed
economy though their welfare losses are very small: the consumption equivalent variation
for this group is -0.06%. This asymmetric effect is a result of two things. First, there is
an income redistribution embedded in the reform. Second, the reformed economy has a
lower aggregate capital (95.3% of the baseline value) and this mostly hurts people with
high productivity.
Variable Reform Only CR Only CR+ Only Only redistr+
high penalties redistribution penalties
Insured by ESHI (%) 67.5 67.8 69.1 64.8 67.6
Individually insured (%) 18.3 2.8 10.1 15.4 22.4
Uninsured (%)
Total 4.7 25.2 16.8 10.2 0.5
High-school dropout 8.1 47.9 39.8 9.6 0.2
High-school graduates 4.3 24.8 16.5 8.9 0.5
College graduates 3.9 16.2 7.7 12.3 0.6
Publicly insured (%) 9.4 4.1 3.9 9.4 9.4
ESHI take-up rate (%) 95.7 96.2 98.0 92.0 95.9
Table 11: Insurance statistics for counterfactual reforms
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Figure 20: Consumption before and after the re-
form (normalized by average wage)
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Figure 21: Variance of consumption before and
after the reform (normalized by average wage)
Figure (22) compares the level and the log-variance of the average consumption before
and after the reform for each educational group. The reform has the opposite effect on
the level of consumption for people with low and high educational attainment. For high-
school dropouts consumption after the reform is higher for all ages. For high-school and
college graduates the reform brings a decline in the average consumption. At the same
time, the variance of log consumption decreases in each educational group. It may seems
surprising that the variance of log consumption decreases significantly even for college
graduates. Majority of this group buys insurance in the employer-based market and are
less affected by the new rules in the individual market. However, it is important to note
that in the baseline economy these people face the risk of loosing ESHI every period.
This event likely coincides with a negative income shock. If it also coincides with a large
medical shock, these people experience a significant change in the price of their health
insurance: instead of community rated group premium they have to buy insurance at a
price fully adjusted for their high expected medical costs. After the reform the loss of
the ESHI becomes less painful for two reasons. First, the individual market also becomes
community rated. Second, people who loose their job with ESHI can become eligible for
a subsidized insurance coverage.
7.5 Decomposing the effect of the reform
To decompose welfare effects of the reform we use several experiments. First, we re-
move the subsidies and Medicaid expansion from the original reform but keep provisions
for the community rated individual market and penalties for individuals without insur-
ance. We call this case ”only community rating”. Second, we keep all the redistributive
measures embedded in the original reform (subsidies and Medicaid expansion) but we
allow for the unregulated individual insurance market (no community rating) and remove
35
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
Age
Co
ns
um
pt
io
n
Consumption, No High−school degree
 
 
Baseline
Reform
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
Age
Co
ns
um
pt
io
n
Variance of Consumption, No High−school degree
 
 
Baseline
Reform
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
Age
Co
ns
um
pt
io
n
Consumption, High−school degree
 
 
Baseline
Reform
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
Age
Co
ns
um
pt
io
n
Variance of Consumption, High−school degree
 
 
Baseline
Reform
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
Age
Co
ns
um
pt
io
n
Consumption, College degree
 
 
Baseline
Reform
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
Age
Co
ns
um
pt
io
n
Variance of Consumption, College degree
 
 
Baseline
Reform
Figure 22: Level (left panel) and variance (right panel) of consumption before and after the reform
(normalized by average wage)
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penalties. We call this version of the reform ”only redistribution”.
Table 10 compares the results of these modified reforms with the original one. The
second row of the table shows the results of implementing the reform with only community
rating. In this case the welfare gains from the reform almost disappears decreasing from
0.97 to 0.05%. The most significant changes are observed among high-school dropouts:
their welfare gains go down from 2.37 to 0.20%. For college graduates the welfare effect
of the reform with the community rating is the same as in the original reform. This is
due to the offsetting effect of the higher aggregate capital which affects this group most.
After the implementation of the reform with only community rating the individual
market suffers from the adverse selection spiral. As can be seen from Figure (23) the
premium in the individual market increases very fast with age and reaches the level
of risk-adjusted premiums for people in the highest grid of medical expenses. In other
words, only people with high expected medical expenses participate in the individual
market. The second column of Table 11 makes this point even clearer by showing that the
participation in the individual market decreases to 2.8%. This suggests that penalties are
not big enough to enforce participation in the community rated individual market. The
fact that in the original version of the reform many people participate in the individual
market is primarily due to the effect of subsidies but not penalties.
To understand whether the small welfare effect of the reform with only community
rating is a result of the adverse selection spiral, we implemented the same reform but
with twice higher penalties. In this case we do not observe the adverse selection spiral
in the individual market: as shown in Figure (23), the price of the individual insurance
is much lower and closer to the average medical expenses. Also the participation in the
individual market increases to 10.1% (third column of Table 11). The welfare results of
this modified reform are presented in the third row Table 10. Comparing to the case
with lower penalties the welfare slightly increases (from 0.05 to 0.09%). However it is
still much lower than in the original reform.
Fourth row of Table 10 shows the results for the reform with only redistribution.
This version of the reform has even larger welfare gains than the original reform: the
consumption equivalent variation goes up from 0.97 to 1.16%30. The increase in welfare
is observed for all educational group: for high-school dropouts CEV increases from 2.37
to 2.46% while for college graduates it goes up from -0.06 to 0.15%. Part of these gains
comes from the elimination of penalties that increases welfare of those who prefer to self-
insure. To understand to what extent the larger welfare gains of the reform with only
redistribution comes from the elimination of penalties we run an experiment where we
30Because households in our model supply labor inelastically we underestimate the distortionary effect
of income redistribution. However the income redistribution we are considering here is very specific and
has only limited distortionary effects in general. First, subsidies only go towards purchase of health
insurance. Second, the amount of subsidies can never exceed the size of a health insurance premium.
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keep the penalties but abandon community rating. In other words, the only modification
to the original reform is a removal of the ban on insurers in the individual market to
condition premiums on risk. We call this version of the reform ”only redistribution with
penalties” and its results are presented in the last row of Table 10. If we compare the
reform with only redistribution and penalties with the original version of the reform, we
see that the former still brings higher welfare gains: 1.10 comparing to 0.97%.
The important result is that the reform with only redistribution brings significantly
higher welfare gains than the reform with only community rating. This suggests that
income-based transfers improve welfare of people much more than the new rules in the
individual market. Many individual market participants have low income and insurance
premiums constitute a significant fraction of their income. Without subsidies they often
prefer to stay uninsured. To illustrate this point further Figure (24) compares the fraction
of individual market premiums in average income before the reform and after the two
versions of reform: with only community rating (with high penalties) and with only
income redistribution. If the reform is implemented with only community rating the
share of premiums in income increases for people with the lowest medical expenses and
decreases for people with the highest medical expenses. However, for people with low
educational attainment the share of community rated premium in income is high: for
high-school dropouts it is never below 10% and can go up to almost 60% for people of
preretirement age. On the other hand, when reform is implemented without community
rating but with subsidies, the share of subsidized individual market premiums in income
for low educational groups is significantly lower even for people with the highest medical
expenses.
Another result from Table 10 is that elimination of community rating from the re-
formed economy increases welfare. At the same time, introduction of community rating
in the baseline economy increases welfare as well.
The opposite welfare effect of community rating in the reformed and the baseline
economy can be explained as follows. On the one hand, community rating has a positive
effect on welfare because it pools health risks and allows people to buy insurance at a
price independent of their expected medical expenses. In other words, in the environment
with persistent medical expenses, community rating protects people against the risk of
premium fluctuations. On the other hand, community rating has a negative effect on
welfare in the environment where people are exposed not only to medical expenses risk
but also to income shocks. This negative effect arises because community rating induces
transfers from healthy to sick that are not conditioned on income. In other words, it
introduces some welfare-reducing transfers from healthy with low income to sick with
high income.
The positive welfare effect of introducing community rating in the baseline economy
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results from the fact that in this economy people without an access to the employer-
based pool do not have any mechanisms protecting them against the risk of premium
fluctuations. Thus they value the new risk-pooling mechanism introduced by community
rating. However, their welfare gains are small because many low-income people choose
not to buy insurance given that premiums constitute a high fraction of their income and
they are likely to be exempt from penalties.
In contrast, community rating has negative welfare effect in the reformed economy. In
this economy people are to a large degree sheltered from the risk of premium fluctuations
by the subsidy scheme. The amount of subsidy is such that it keeps the share of insurance
premiums in income at a low level. For example, for a person with income between 150
and 200% of FPL the subsidy guarantees that his premium does not exceed 3.5% of
his income regardless of how high his premium in the individual market is. Because
of subsidies, community rating does not add much value in terms of elimination of the
premiums fluctuations risk. Thus the negative effect of transfers from healthy with low-
income to sick with high-income dominates.
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Figure 23: Individual market premiums for different version of the reform
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Figure 24: Fraction of individual insurance premiums in income for people with the lowest (left panel)
and highest (right panel) medical costs
40
8 Conclusion
Health reform bill recently signed by the President includes a wide range of measures
aiming to increase the health insurance coverage in the U.S. The new law significantly
changes the rules under which the individual insurance market operates. At the same
time it includes a set of redistributive measures that decrease the price of insurance for
low-income people. This paper measures the welfare effect of the reform and decomposes
it into the part that is due to the reorganization of the individual market, and to the
part that is due to the increased income redistribution in the economy.
We construct a general equilibrium heterogeneous models with a rich representation
of the current U.S. health insurance system. We calibrate the model using Medical
Expenses Panel Survey to match the key insurance statistics of the U.S. economy.
We find that the reform brings significant welfare gains (almost 1% of the annual con-
sumption) measured as ex-ante welfare of a newborn in the steady-sate of the reformed
economy. However higher welfare gains can be achieved by just the redistributive part
of the reform without introducing community rating in the individual market. Majority
of individual market participants have low-income and they gain a lot from having sub-
sidized health insurance. In addition, the subsidy scheme also plays a role as insurance
against the risk of insurance premiums fluctuations. Reorganizing the individual insur-
ance market alone has limited effect on these people because non-subsidized insurance
premiums, whether community rated or not, constitute such a significant portion of their
income that they often prefer to stay uninsured if not subsidized. Moreover, community
rating induces some transfers from healthy people with low income to sick people with
high-income. These transfers can only be partially offset by income-based subsidies and
thus reduce welfare.
9 Appendix
9.1 ESHI response to reform
When evaluating the welfare implications of the reform we assumed that there is no
response from the firm offering ESHI. This section reevaluates welfare effects of the reform
when this assumption is relaxed. In particular we consider how the results change if in
response to the reform firms offering ESHI decrease its contribution rate. This experiment
is motivated by the result in Gruber and McKnight (2003) who found that expansion
in Medicaid eligibility in the late 1980s and early 1990s led to a decline in employers
contributions to health insurance premiums. Table 12 compares welfare effects of the
reform if there is no change in the employer contribution rate (ψ) to a case when it
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decreases to 50%31. When the reform induces firms to decrease contribution rates this
CEV(%) Agg. capital
No high-school High-school College
All newborns degree degree degree
ψ does not change 0.97 2.37 1.79 -0.06 3.24
ψ decreases to 50% 0.60 2.46 1.44 -0.54 3.26
Table 12: Welfare effects of the reform under different assumptions on ESHI
mostly affects people with a college degree: their CEV goes down from -0.06 to -0.54.
For people with the highest educational attainment the employer-based pool is a primary
source of coverage. When the employer contribution rate declines, it leads to a partial
destruction of this pool because younger people prefer to switch to the individual market
where premiums are age-adjusted. This increases the group premium and decreases
welfare of people buying ESHI. For people with lower educational attainment who rely
less on ESHI the welfare does not change much. Because of this the overall welfare effects
of the reform is still significant despite a large decline in the employer contribution rate.
9.2 Effective tax rates
Figure (25) compares marginal income tax rates before and after the reform. The
burden of the tax increase falls disproportionately on people with high income. If for
a person with income at the level of the average wage the marginal tax rate increases
by 0.91 percentage points, for a person with income three times higher than the average
wage tax rate increases by around 1.2 percentage points.
Apart from changing income tax rates the reform also introduces two additional types
of transfers. First, low-income people get subsidies to finance their health insurance
purchase. Second, people with low medical expenses cross-subsidize people with high-
medical expenses through the community rated individual market. Thus the former
group of people pays an implicit health tax, while the later group receives an implicit
health subsidy. Figure (26) shows how these additional transfers change the average
effective tax rates in the economy32. Because implicit transfers through the community
rated individual market depend on individual health expenditures, Figure (26) compares
31The scenario when an average employer contribution rate decreases from more than 70 to 50% after
the implementation of the reform is unlikely because the Bill requires employers whose workers face high
group premiums to pay penalties. However we construct this experiment to emphasize the directions of
the welfare change.
32Note, that both subsidies and implicit transfers through community rating only affect those who
participate in the individual market. Thus all the graphs in Figure (26) are constructed for people who
buy individual insurance.
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Figure 25: Change in the marginal tax rates after the reform
effective tax rates for people with the lowest and highest medical costs. The comparison
is done using an example of a 50 year old person because for this age group the difference
in medical costs is very pronounced and this makes illustration more clear.
In all four graphs the solid line represents the average income tax people pay after
the reform. The dotted line in the top two figures shows the tax rate once the subsidies
are taken into account. Because insurance premiums are the same for people with high
and low medical expenses, the size of the subsidy is the same for all people in the same
income group. However, once implicit transfers through community rating is taken into
account (as represented by dash-dotted line in the top two graphs), the effective tax rates
become different for people with low and high medical expenses. For a person with the
highest medical expenses the effective tax rate decreases, while for a person with the
lowest medical expenses the tax rate increases.
Another observation is that while subsidies decrease effective tax rates only for people
with income below 400% FPL (which corresponds to income to average wage ratio equal
approximately to one), implicit transfers through community rating change effective tax
rates for all categories of income. When implicit health tax is taken into account, people
with low medical expenses pay more than what is implied by a pure income tax. At the
same time people with high medical expenses pay less.
The bottom two graphs show how the effective tax rates change if the reform is im-
plemented with only redistribution. In this case there is no implicit transfers through
community rating. Because people with different medical expenses face different pre-
miums, they receive subsidies of a different size. Moreover, the effective tax rate for
people at low income level is the same as effective tax rates in the original reform when
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Figure 26: Implicit and explicit transfers and effective tax rates in the reformed economy
implicit transfers are taken into account. This means that after the reform with only
redistribution implicit transfers through community rating are incorporated into explicit
subsidies. However, in contrast to the original reform, the reform with only redistribution
eliminates medical expenses-based transfers to people with high income. For this group
of people effective taxes are the same as income taxes.
9.3 Computational algorithm
We solved for the steady state equilibrium of the baseline model as follows.
1. Guess an initial interest rate r, price in the group insurance market p, and the
amount the firm offering ESHI subtracts from the wage of their workers cE.
In general, insurance markets where firms are not allowed to risk-adjust premiums, as
in the group market, can have multiple equilibriums. However, because the major part
of the premium is contributed by the employer, people are less sensitive to the price of
insurance and thus multiplicity of equilibriums becomes less of an issue. In particular,
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our equilibrium price tends to be invariant to the initial guess.
2. Set initial value for the parameter a2.
3. Solve for the households’ decision rules using backward induction. In the last
period (t = N), the value function and policy functions can be solved for analytically.
For every age t prior to N and for each point in the state space, we optimize with respect
to savings and insurance decisions. We evaluate the value function for points outside the
state space grid using a Piecewise Cubic Hermite Interpolating Polynomial (PCHIP).
4. Guess an initial asset distribution of newborns (which corresponds to the distrib-
ution of bequests).
5. Given policy functions and the distribution of newborns, simulate the households
distribution using non-stochastic method as in Young (2010). We reiterate until the
distribution of bequests converges.
6. Use the distribution of households and policy functions to compute government
budget deficit/surplus. Update tax function parameter a2 and repeat steps 3-6 until
government budget is balanced. More specifically, we use function zbrent to find a2 that
balances the budget.
7. Using the distribution of households and policy functions check if market clearing
conditions and zero profit conditions for insurance firms hold. If not, update r, p, and
cE and repeat steps 1-8.
The computation of the steady state for the reformed economy is complicated by the
fact that now we need to compute additional 40 prices (for each working age) in the
individual community rated market. We modified the algorithm above by guessing these
40 prices at step 1 and updating them at step 8. As was mentioned in the main text,
in the case of the original reform the multiplicity of equilibrium is not likely to be an
issue; individuals’ insurance decisions are less sensitive to equilibrium price because of
the subsidy scheme. When the reform is implemented without subsidies we cannot rule
out the multiplicity of equilibrium. In this case we trap the price from below starting
from a guess that is too low to be an equilibrium. Then we update the price upwards
slowly.
9.4 Partial equilibrium
The implementation of the reform in the baseline economy leads to a decrease in
the aggregate capital from 3.40 to 3.23 due to increased risk-sharing and a decline in
precautionary savings. In this section we reevaluate welfare effects of the reform in the
partial equilibrium setup. Thus we consider the U.S. as an open economy that faces
fixed interest rate. The results of this experiment are presented in Table 13. Under
the assumption of partial equilibrium the results do not significantly change because
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CEV(%) Agg. capital
No high-school High-school College
All newborns degree degree degree
Reform 1.54 2.31 2.31 0.67 3.40
Only CR+high penalties 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.13 3.40
Only redistribution 1.68 2.34 2.45 0.83 3.40
Table 13: Welfare effect of different versions of the reform in the partial equilibrium
the change in the aggregate capital in the general equilibrium environment was not big.
Comparing to the first row of Table 10 most noticeable changes are observed among
people with college education: their CEV increases from -0.06 to 0.67. This is due to the
fact that this group is the most productive and thus get affected by the decrease in the
aggregate capital observed in the general equilibrium case the most. However, the relative
importance of the redistributive measures of the reform compared to the regulation of
the individual market stays the same. As in the general equilibrium environment most
of the welfare gains from the reform come from subsidies and Medicaid expansion.
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